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The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is charged 
with protecting the United States from those who pollute the land, 
air, and water for, among other reasons, economic gain.! Inherent in 
the EPA's function is the obligation to enforce, through judicial or 
administrative action, the regulations2 which govern the amount of 
pollutants released into our nation's environs. The ability to deter 
effectively pollution through burdensome civil penalties is based on 
simple financial considerations: it should be more cost efficient to 
t The opinions expressed in this Article are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of their respective employers. 
* Jay Ryan (J.D., LL.M. International 'Irade and Banking) is an Associate with Van Ness, 
Feldman in Washington, D.C. and is currently pursuing his second LL.M. (Environmental Law) 
at the National Law Center at George Washington University. 
** Charles Garlow is a Senior Attorney in the Office of Enforcement, Air Division, United 
States Environmental Protection Agency. 
1 See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988) (delineating the congressional declaration of purpose for the 
organization of the EPA); Statement of Organization and General Information, 40 C.F.R. § § 1.1, 
1.3 (1993) (setting out the authority, purpose, and functions of the EPA). The EPA, under the 
Reorganization Plan 3 of 1970, became the primary agency for controlling and abating pollution. 
Prior to the reorganization, antipollution efforts were shared by many different agencies includ-
ing, but not limited to, the Department of the Interior, the Department of Health, Education 
and Welfare, and the Department of Agriculture. See 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988). 
2 See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-799.5055 (1992) (containing regulations governing pollution control). 
Title 40, Protection of the Environment, parts 1-799, is comprised of fifteen volumes. 
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comply with environmental regulations than it would be to pay fines 
for non-compliance. The EPA's enforcement policy relies on the as-
sumption that appropriate civil penalties, at the very least, negate 
any economic benefit gained from non-compliance.3 This assumption, 
however, appears flawed. Current civil penalties, when assessed, do 
not fully account for all of the economic gains made by illegal corpo-
rate activity because they omit considerations of increased market 
share.4 This Article addresses the EPA's civil penalty policy and pro-
poses improvements in the methodology used to determine liability.5 
These proposals are advanced with the hope that the EPA, state and 
local environmental enforcement agencies, citizens' groups, and cor-
porate America all will embrace the suggested proposals. 
Section II of this Article discusses the policies behind the EPA's use 
of civil penalties as a means of deterring non-compliance with envi-
ronmental regulations. Section III examines the methodologies used 
to determine the amount of civil penalties owed by a non-compliant 
source. Section IV offers a critique of the EPA's current civil penalty 
assessment program. Section V recommends corrections to the as-
sessment formula and offers suggestions as to how to reformulate 
penalty assessment methods so as to account for increased market 
3 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (GENERAL ENFORCEMENT POLICY COMPEM-
DruM, GM-21) POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES (Feb. 16,1984) [hereinafter PENALTY POLICY] (on 
file at the law library at EPA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.) reprinted in 1987 Envtl L. Rep. 
(Envt. L. Inst.) 35,083. 
4 See Keith Schneider, $11.1 Million Pollution Fine Too Soft?, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1993, at 
D22. The article describes the controversy over the penalty amount assessed against Louisi-
ana-Pacific, a major polluter, after a highly publicized press conference involving EPA Admin-
istrator Carol Browner and Attorney General Janet Reno. The penalty, $11 million, was the 
largest ever assessed under the Clean Air Act. [d. Critics, however, charged that the "penalty 
was minor compared with the enormous market advantage the company had gained by breaking 
environmental laws." [d. In fact, Louisiana-Pacific, the nation's largest manufacturer of wood-
fiber construction products, in a somewhat brazen but honest statement, indicated that the 
penalty would not affect its earnings. [d. Jonathan Turley, a professor of law at George Wash-
ington University, said that Louisiana-Pacific's behavior, and the resulting fines, are a "prime 
example of how a company can dominate a market by avoiding the costs of complying with 
environmental laws" [d. (emphasis added). The article goes on to say that by falsifying infor-
mation, and failing to comply with environmental regulations, Louisiana-Pacific was consistently 
ahead of others in the market because they avoided the cost and time associated with installing 
pollution control equipment. See id. 
5 It is not the intention of the authors to criticize environmental enforcement agencies for the 
work that they have accomplished. Indeed, the EPA's record-setting fines and penalties continue 
to increase every year. See U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-91-166, 5 ENVI-
RONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT (1991) [hereinafter ENV. ENFORCEMENT] (reporting that assessed 
penalties in 1989 totalled $35 million while assessed penalties in 1990 totalled $61 million). 
Rather, it is the authors' intention to criticize the construct within which the enforcement 
program is run. 
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share. Section V also provides an analysis of the penalty assessment 
proposal, specifically aimed at both citizens' groups and corporate 
parties, that details the benefits of reformulating civil penalty criteria. 
II. THE GOALS OF THE EPA's CIVIL PENALTY PROGRAM 
A. Background 
Federal environmental statutes contain various enforcement tools 
including: (1) notices of violation; (2) administrative compliance or-
ders; (3) administrative orders that assess civil penalties; (4) criminal 
sanctions; (5) judicial penalties and injunctive relief; and (6) citizen 
suit provisions.6 Federal enforcement powers developed in the early 
1970s when Congress became concerned that states were not enforc-
ing environmental violations to the fullest extent.7 This Congres-
sional concern precipitated enactment of federal environmental stat-
utes that contained enforcement measures which, among other things, 
gave the EPA the power to assess monetary penalties.8 
Civil penalty provisions in federal environmental laws typically 
range from $5,000 to $25,000 per violation and may be assessed against 
persons, facilities, and "owners and operators" offacilities.9 The EPA's 
goals in measuring and assessing penalties are threefold. The EPA 
seeks to deter non-compliance of government regulation;lO looks to 
provide an equitable regimen for actors in the regulated community;l1 
and desires to bring about the most expeditious resolution of environ-
mental problems.12 To further these goals, the EPA has formulated 
guidelines to use in implementing its penalty assessment program.13 
All enforcement actions taken, either through administrative or judi-
6 Environmental Law Institute, 5 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND PRACTICE, § 22.01,22-6 (Don-
ald W. Stever and Eliza A. Dolin eds., 1994) [hereinafter PRACTICE MANUAL]. 
7 Id. at 22-24. 
8 See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 309(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(g) (1988 & Supp. v 1993); Clean Air Act 
§ U3(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(d) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); RCRA § 3008(a), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) (1988); 
TSCA § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (1988 & Supp. v 1993); FIFRA § 136(l), 7 U.S.C. § 136(l) (1988 & 
Supp. V 1993). 
9 J. GORDON ARBUCKLE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY HANDBOOK 44-45 (12th ed. 1993). 
10 See PENALTY POLICY, supra note 3, at 35,083 (listing the goals, and offering explanations, 
of EPNs enforcement policies). 
11 Id. 
12Id. 
13 See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GM-22, GENERAL ENFORCEMENT POLICY 
COMPENDIUM, A FRAMEWORK FOR STATUTE-SPECIFIC ApPROACHES TO PENALTY ASSESS-
MENTS: IMPLEMENTING EPNs POLICY ON CIVIL PENALTIES (February 16, 1984) [hereinafter 
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cial avenues, must conform with stated penalty assessment program 
goals and their implementing guidelines.14 
B. Deterrence15 
First and foremost, the EPA's civil penalty assessment program is 
designed to prevent environmental violations from occurring, and, if 
they do occur, to prevent repetition of violations.16 For penalties to be 
effective as deterrent measures, alleged violators must suffer reper-
cussions in such a manner that violators find themselves disadvan-
taged economically as a direct result of noncomplianceP If this were 
not the case, those companies that had previously complied with the 
environmental regulations would face competitive disadvantages.18 
Thus, at the very least, the EPA should structure every civil penalty 
assessment in such a manner to negate all of the economic benefits 
that have accrued to companies during the period of their violations.19 
In addition to the elimination of any economic advantage gained by 
violators, the deterrence goals require that additional penalties be 
assessed. If the EPA fails to assess these additional penalties, the 
deterrence factor is weakened. Recouping the economic benefit alone 
merely places violators in the same position as they were before they 
failed to comply with the applicable environmental regulations.20 Sig-
nificant deterrence and regulatory equity require that violators be 
left in a worse position than if they had spent time and money to 
comply with the environmental regulations in the first place. This 
policy encourages compliance in the regulated community. The regu-
lated community realizes that non-compliance results in a loss of 
economic benefits and additional fines analogous to punitive damages. 
FRAMEWORK] (on file at the law library at EPA Headquarters, Washington, D.C.) reprinted in 
1987 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 35,073 (documenting the factors to be taken into account 
when assessing civil penalties). 
14 See PENALTY POLICY, supra note 3, at 35,084 (stating that deviations are allowed on an 
individual basis). All deviations must be accompanied by documentation supporting and clarify-
ing the reasons for the variation in penalty assessment. Id. 
15 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 405 (5th ed. 1979) (defining deterrent as "anything which 
impedes or has a tendency to prevent"). 
16 See PENALTY POLICY, supra note 3, at 35,083. 
17 See id. (explaining that if the case development team fails to recoup economic benefits, it 
must explicitly detail, in writing, the reasons behind the decision before the settlement can be 
forwarded to an Assistant Administrator for signature). 
18Id. 
19 See FRAMEWORK, supra note 13, at 35,074 (stating that the EPA labels this part of the 
penalty as the economic benefit of noncompliance or "benefit component''). 
20 See id. at 35,075. 
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The additional fines levied against violators reflect the seriousness 
of the offense.21 When evaluating the seriousness of an offense the 
EPA will look at several factors: (1) the amount of pollutants dis-
charged; (2) the toxicity of the pollutants; (3) the sensitivity of the 
environment in which pollutants were released; (4) the length of time 
during which the violation occurred; and (5) the size of the violations.22 
These "gravity" fines are consistent with congressional intent. Most 
environmental statutes contain provisions which factor into the pen-
alty equation an amount that reflects the level of damage done to the 
environment. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, And Liability Act (CERCLA),23 the Clean Air Act,24 the 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act),25 the Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA),26 and 
the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)27 all contain 
language that mandates an evaluation of the extent of environmental 
violations. Thus, the statutes require something further than a mere 
recoupment of the economic benefit gained through noncompliance.28 
The statutes mandate additional penalties to increase the likelihood 
that penalties will deter not only violating parties but also other 
members of the regulated community.29 
C. Establishment of a Level Economic Playing Field 
The EPA's civil penalty assessment program is also designed to 
promote an equitable system of regulation.30 Under the current sys-
21 See id. at 35,074 (stating that the EPA labels this as the "gravity component" of the penalty). 
22 See id. 
2B See CERCLA § 109(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9609 (1988) (requiring that the "gravity of a violation" 
be taken into account when determining a civil penalty). 
24 See Clean Air Act § 113(e)(I), 42 U.S.C. § 7413(e)(I) (Supp. IV 1992) (stating that penalty 
assessment criteria should include the "seriousness of a violation"). 
25 See Clean Water Act § 309(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (stating that a 
determination of civil penalties shall include an assessment of the "seriousness of the violation 
or violations"). 
26 See EPCRA § 325(b)(I)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(b)(I) (1988) (declaring that the Administrator 
must take into account, inter alia, the "extent and gravity of the violation"). 
27 See RCRA § 3008(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(3) (1988) (stating that when assessing a civil 
penalty the Administrator "shall take into account the seriousness of the violation"). 
28 See PENALTY POLICY, supra note 3, at 35,083. 
29 See id. (explaining that the deterrence function of civil penalties serves dual functions). As 
a specific deterrent the penalties are used to prevent a violator from making repeat violations. 
Id. As a general deterrent the penalties are designed to put others in the regulated community 
on notice that violations of the law are an economically inefficient manner in which to run a 
corporation. Id. 
:30 FRAMEWORK, supra note 13, at 35,074. 
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tern of regulation, pollution control requirements are necessary for 
every similarly situated source in a regulated community.31 Therefore, 
all sources are required to expend capital on mechanisms designed to 
conform to environmental regulations.32 If sources fail to comply with 
applicable regulations, the EPA assesses fines.33 The assessed fines 
are in addition to the capital expenditures needed to purchase and 
install the pollution control mechanisms already in use by others in 
the regulated community.34 Penalties should conform to a certain set 
of standards while remaining elastic enough to account for individual 
circumstances.35 Consistency, uniformity, and flexibility in the appli-
cation of the penalty assessment program, decrease the likelihood 
that the parties will challenge enforcement actions on grounds of 
arbitrariness and capriciousness.36 The lack of rigidity in the penalty 
assessment program allows the EPA, upon a clear showing by viola-
tors, to take into account any mitigating factors.37 
In addition to reducing an initial penalty assessment, mitigating 
factors may be used to increase a preliminary determination of the 
appropriate penalty amount. Once an "initial penalty target figure" is 
determined by the case development team, the EPA initiates formal 
settlement negotiations.38 The target figure-the amount which the 
EPA initially feels it is obligated to recover-may later be adjusted 
to take into account any other relevant information that comes to 
31 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 112,42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (regulating air toxics). 
For each major source EPA will require the installation of "maximum achievable control 
technology." Clean Water Act § 306,33 U.S.C. § 1316 (1988) (regulating new sources). Section 
306 new source performance standards requires the greatest degree of effluent reduction 
through the use of the best available demonstrated control technology. Id. 
32 See, e.g., id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7412. 
33 See FRAMEWORK, supra note 13, at 35,074; PENALTY POLICY, supra note 3, at 35,083. 
34 See FRAMEWORK, supra note 13, at 35,075 (noting that violations result in deferred costs 
when a violator fails to install equipment needed to meet pollution control standards). 
35 See id. at 35,078. 
36 PENALTY POLICY, supra note 3, at 35,084. 
37 See id. (listing mitigating factors). The factors include: (1) the amount of cooperation shown 
by the offender in an attempt to bring about the fastest resolution of the problem possible; (2) 
the amount of negligence, or intentional disregard for the law, shown in committing the offense; 
(3) the ability of the violating party to pay a levied fine; (4) whether or not the violator has 
engaged in a history of non-compliance; and (5) any other unique factors that distinguish the 
violator's case. Id. 
38 See id. (explaining how the initial target figure is used by the EPA). The penalty target 
figure becomes part of the complaint when an administrative action is filed. In a judicial action, 
however, the target figure is used as a base figure which becomes the preliminary settlement 
goal. The figure remains confidential to the case settlement team and, as a general rule, is not 
revealed to the alleged violator. The case settlement team may use its discretion if it feels that 
revealing the target goal would expedite the settlement process. Id. 
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light.39 Consistent implementation of the penalty assessment program 
discourages protracted litigation.40 This, in turn, promotes the third 
goal of the EPA's penalty assessment program, which is to provide an 
immediate response to environmental infractions. 
D. Swift Resolution of Environmental Problems 
Finally, the EPA's civil penalty assessment program is designed to 
prompt violators to conduct remedial efforts in the fastest possible 
manner.41 To achieve this goal, the EPA undertakes two different, but 
related, types of actions. To encourage violator-initiated remedies, the 
EPA provides incentives for immediate compliance and disincentives 
for delayed compliance after the commission of a violation.42 Incen-
tives may take any form43 and may include a reduction in the gravity 
component of the penalty based upon the timeliness of the response 
to the EPA's notice ofviolation.44 Self-reporting, which ensures a more 
immediate environmental response, lowers violators' penalty assess-
ments.45 Furthermore, the EPA will generally reduce penalties if 
violators undertake corrective actions before the institution of litiga-
tion or administrative actions by the EPA or the United States At-
torney's Office.46 Disincentives include an adjustment of the initial 
penalty target figure upwards if violators engage in protracted set-
tlement negotiations while violations continue.47 The EPA also has a 
number of enforcement actions that the agency may undertake in 
order to ensure compliance.48 These actions include, but are not lim-
ited to, administrative compliance offers, temporary restraining or-
ders, and permanent injunctions. These tools, however, may not be as 
useful as, or may be more cumbersome than, the aforementioned 
economic incentives. 
39 See ENV. ENFORCEMENT, supra note 5, at 5 n.l. 
40 PENALTY POLICY, supra note 3, at 35,084. 
41 See FRAMEWORK, supra note 13, at 35,074. 
42 See id. 
43 See PENALTY POLICY, supra note 3, at 35,084. The incentives, however, cannot allow the 
offender to maintain the economics derived from the noncompliance. [d. 
44 [d. (explaining under what circumstances the EPA will consider lowering a penalty amount). 
45 [d. (listing degree of cooperation as a factor that may mitigate penalty). 
46 [d. An action is deemed to have commenced when an Assistant United States Attorney files 
a complaint or when a violator files a response to an administrative complaint. [d. at n.lo 
47 [d. (advising EPA case development teams to inform the alleged violator of this policy 
before the settlement negotiations commence). 
48 See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1319 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (enforcement provisions of Clean Water 
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7413 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (enforcement provisions of Clean Air Act). 
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E. Calculating the Benefit Component to Achieve the Goals of the 
EPA's Penalty Assessment Program 
In order to give full effect to the goals of the penalty assessment 
program, the EPA devised a model for calculating and establishing 
civil penalties for the violation of environmental regulations.49 The 
model's specific and primary goal is to estimate the economic benefits 
gained through noncompliance of environmental regulations.50 On a 
secondary level, the calculations, based on computer generated for-
mulas, seek to ensure uniformity throughout different regions and 
different industries. Through the model, the EPA also seeks consis-
tency in the enforcement of different environmental statutes.51 
III. CIVIL PENALTY ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 
A. Introduction to the BEN Model 
The centerpiece of the EPA's civil penalty assessment program 
prevents violators from benefitting financially as a result of their 
failure to comply with environmental regulations.52 In order to deter-
mine the amount of financial gain achieved by violators' non-compli-
ance, the EPA utilizes a computer model53 that estimates economic 
benefits that have accrued to any violators during periods of violation. 
The computer model, commonly referred to as the BEN model,54 
provides a uniform quantitative analysis of environmental violations.55 
The EPA adopted the BEN model because of the advantages that 
the model provides over other methods of civil penalty assessment.56 
For example, the BEN model does not require that EPA case devel-
opment teams engage in financial research or numerical estimations.57 
Using the BEN model also allows violators to take active roles in the 
49 See EPA, BEN: A MODEL TO CALCULATE THE ECONOMIC BENEFIT OF NON-COMPLIANCE, 
USER'S MANUAL (June 1990) [hereinafter "USER'S MANUAL"] (detailing the use of the BEN 
model computer program). 
50Id. 
51 FRAMEWORK, supra note 13, at 35,080-81. 
52Id. at 35,075. 
53Id. 
54 BEN is an acronym for "economic benefit." 
55 See PENALTY POLICY, supra note 3, at 35,085. 
56Id. 
57 See EPA, MEMORANDUM: GUIDANCE FOR CALCULATING THE ECONOMIC BENEFIT FOR 
NONCOMPLIANCE FOR A CIVIL PENALTY ASSESSMENT (Nov. 5,1984) [hereinafter GUIDANCE] 
(on file at the law library at EPA headquarters, Washington, D.C.), reprinted in 1987 Envt. L. 
Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 35,085. 
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penalty assessment process by voluntarily submitting financial data 
and, thus, conserves the EPA's resources.58 As a result, the EPA's time 
and resources are not wasted on repetitive calculations. In addition, 
because the BEN model uses standard variables, and because penal-
ties determined by the BEN model are always relative to other pen-
alties that are assessed, adjudicatory bodies are more likely to defer 
to the EPA's assessment.59 Standard variables also provide and main-
tain a high degree of consistency.60 
Furthermore, the formula used by the BEN model allows violators 
to provide input into the penalty assessment process. Aside from the 
standard variables that are repeatedly used, violators provide finan-
cial information to input into the other variables used to determine 
liability.61 Thus, to a certain extent, violators will help determine 
appropriate fines. A violators' ability to influence the penalty assess-
ment process also lends itself to judicial deference.62 Violator partici-
pation eliminates a significant amount of time that would otherwise 
have been spent defending the accuracy and equity of civil penalty 
assessment calculations.63 
The BEN model is used to calculate the accrual of economic benefits 
resulting from a delay in installing pollution control equipment or 
from a failure to utilize and support pollution control equipment al-
ready in place.64 As a general rule, EPA personnel must use the BEN 
model when the "rule-of-thumb" method65 estimates penalties exceed-
ing $10,000. If the period of non-compliance is substantially lengthy, 
the rule-of-thumb method usually underestimates the economic benefit 
gained from non-compliance.66 The BEN model should be used when 
environmental non-compliance involves postponed or ignored pollu-
tion-related capital expenditures.67 The BEN model should also be 
used when the rule-of-thumb method produces penalties the accuracy 
of which is disputed by violators.68 
58 Id. 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
6! See id. 
62 See FRAMEWORK, supra note 13, at 35,078. 
6.1 See id. at 35,079. 
64 GUIDANCE, supra note 57, at 35,085. 
65 See FRAMEWORK, supra note 13, at 35,076 (detailing the process used in the rule-of-thumb 
method of economic benefits). Under the rule-of-thumb method, the economic gains ofa violator 
are estimated at "5% per year of the delayed one-time capital cost from the period from the 
date of violation began until the date of compliance was or is expected to be achieved"). Id. 
66 Id. at 35,075. 
67 GUIDANCE, supra note 57, at 35,085. 
f}3 Id. 
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B. BEN Model Methodology 
The BEN equation uses thirteen different variables to estimate 
the economic benefits of non-compliance with federal environmental 
laws.69 Of the thirteen variables, eight can adopt standard value meas-
ures. The other five variables require the EPA to input70 information 
regarding the dates of non-compliance, the date of compliance, the 
penalty payment date, the dollar amount that the company would 
have expended had it provided for pollution control measures on time, 
and the delayed costs involving capital investments.71 
The formula used in the BEN model is based upon certain assump-
tions about the lack of pollution control expenditures and the resul-
tant delayed compliance. The BEN model originates from the premise 
that violators will eventually comply, or have finally complied with, 
any applicable regulations and will install necessary equipment to 
guarantee compliance.72 The BEN model then assumes that violators 
should have installed, but did not, the same pieces of equipment in the 
69 See Robert H.Fuhrman, The Role of EPA's BEN Model in Establishing Civil Penalties, 
1991 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,246, 10,253 (giving an example of a BEN Model Calcu-
lation). The thirteen factors are: (1) case name, statute and profit/nonprofit status; (2) initial 
capital investment; (3) one-time nondepreciable expenditure; (4) annual expenses; (5) first month 
of non-compliance; (6) compliance date; (7) penalty payment date; (8) useful life of pollution 
control equipment; (9) marginal income tax rate for 1986 and before; (10) marginal income tax 
rate for 1987 and beyond; (11) annual inflation rate; (12) discount rate: corporate equity rate; 
and (13) low interest financing and corporate debt rate. Id.; see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
(5th ed. 1979) (defining the economic terms above). "Capital investment" is the buying price of 
a capital asset. Id. at 189. "Discount rate" is the "percentage of the face amount of commercial 
paper which a holder pays when he transfers such paper to a financial institution for cash or 
credit." Id. at 418. 
70 The required input variables are the avenue by which the violators can influence the final 
penalty assessment. 
71 See generally Fuhrman, supra note 69. 
72 But see Jasbinder Singh, EPA's Narrow Definition of Economic Benefit Vastly Increases 
Its Economic Benefit Estimate, 1993 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,121, 10,121-22 (arguing 
against the current BEN assumption that the violator uses the same piece of equipment to 
ultimately comply as it would have used had it complied on time). Singh argues that the BEN 
model does not accurately reflect a situation in which there are differing circumstances that 
result in different compliance costs for on-time compliance costs and delayed compliance costs. 
Id. at 10,122. For example, technology, in the years of non-compliance, could have improved 
pollution control mechanisms while reducing their cost. Thus, the cost of installing pollution 
control equipment after being notified of a violation would not be the same expenditure if the 
source had complied on time-it would be cheaper. See id. Singh, however, fails to take into 
account the importance of maintaining a level playing field in the regulated community. Non-
compliant sources' costs must be measured against the costs of those in the regulated commu-
nity who did comply with the law on time. Even if pollution control mechanisms are cheaper to 
purchase after delayed compliance, the non-compliant source's penalty should reflect the costs 
that the compliant sources incurred when they purchased the pollution control mechanisms on 
time. See id. 
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year that they should have been in compliance.73 The time value of 
money is calculated for the delayed expenditure, and added to annual 
operating costs not expended, yielding the economic benefit. The 
BEN model's formula determines the economic benefit by estimating 
the capital involved in buying equipment to bring violators into com-
pliance with environmental regulations, estimating the amount of 
capital that would have been involved in buying equipment without 
delay, discounting the cash flows, subtracting the discounted values 
to arrive at the economic benefit, and then adjusting upwards the 
value of the economic benefit at the time the penalty is to be paid.74 
C. The BEN Model's Failings 
Industry attorneys criticize the BEN model on many fronts.75 Not 
surprisingly, most of the criticisms of the BEN model claim that 
violators are being assessed too much.76 In reality, the opposite is true. 
If the foundation of the EPA's penalty assessment program were 
sound, and civil penalties deterred future violations, corporations would 
not continue to violate environmental regulations. Moreover, if the 
criticisms of the BEN model were accurate, and current civil assess-
ments were inaccurate and overestimated-and thus more of a deter-
rent than necessary-there should have been a dramatic decrease in 
environmental violations. If, after all, penalties deter violations, over-
estimated penalties would serve as a greater deterrent. Although the 
reasoning of this argument is sound, its application to present day 
environmental enforcement is misguided. The fact is, there has not 
been a decline in the number of environmental violations.77 Further-
more, the lack of resources at the EPA provides companies with a 
73 See id. at 10,121 (reducing the current BEN assumptions to a mathematical formula). Singh 
shows that the year of compliance is represented by T; the date compliance should have occurred 
is T-n (n representing the length of delay); the compliance cost is C1 in year T; and the 
compliance cost in T-n is C2. See id. Singh correctly points out that C1 = C2 = C (C being the 
compliance cost) because the model assumes that same piece of equipment is installed in both 
T and T-n. See id. (emphasis in original). 
74Id. 
75 See, e.g. Singh, supra note 72, at 10,121 (claiming that the model overestimates the economic 
benefit); Fuhrman, supra note 69, at 10,246 (asserting that deficient methodologies heavily favor 
the EPA); Philip Saunders Jr., Civil Penalties and the Economic Benefits of Noncompliance: A 
Better Alternative for Attorney's Than EPA'S BEN Model, 22 Envtl L. Rep. (Envtl. L. lnst.) 
10,003 (Jan. 1992) (claiming that standardized assumptions result in significant miscalculations 
of the economic benefit). 
76 See Fuhrman, supra note 69, at 10,249; Saunders, supra note 75 at 10,004; Singh, supra note 
72, at 10,123. 
77 ENV. ENFORCEMENT, supra note 5, at 5. 
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comfort level that allows them to risk non-compliance with environ-
mental regulations.78 
Contrary to industry claims, the EPA's current civil penalty assess-
ment program falls short of a full accounting of the economic gains 
made by environmental non-compliance because the program fails to 
account for the market share gains made during periods of non-com-
pliance.79 As a result, corporations still find non-compliance with en-
vironmental regulations economically more efficient, offering a dis-
tinct advantage over their competitors who do comply.so The economic 
benefits of non-compliance are directly related to the BEN model's 
failure to consider increases in market share that occur during periods 
of non-complianceP Thus, disregard for existing regulations not only 
damages the environment but also challenges the principles of the 
free market economy that ensure effective competition in the market-
place.82 Effective competition requires, inter alia, a reasonable degree 
of parity in the marketplace.83 
IV. THE BEN MODEL'S FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR INCREASED 
SALES AND PERMANENT MARKET SHARE GAINED DURING 
PERIODS OF ENVIRONMENTAL NON-COMPLIANCE 
Without the promotion of parity in the marketplace through effec-
tive regulation, the regulated community cannot compete on a level 
playing field. Yet, without an assessment of increased market share 
in the EPA's civil penalty programs, companies that comply with 
environmental regulations and with the costs associated with the 
regulations, will face a competitive disadvantage. This provides a 
disincentive for companies to expend the initial capital costs involved 
in purchasing pollution control mechanisms. 
The best comparative illustration of the ramifications of the current 
penalty policy is corporate America's view of federal environmental 
regulation's impact on international competitiveness. Most American 
companies feel that they face economic disadvantages vis-a-vis for-
eign competitors because of the stringent environmental regulations 
78 [d. 
79 [d. 
80 See generally Schneider, supra note 4 (demonstrating how a company can edge ahead of its 
competitors by avoiding the costs of compliance). 
81 See Saunders, supra note 75, at 10,008. 
82 WILLIAM G. SHEPARD, THE ECONOMICS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 16 (1990). 
83 [d. 
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that pervade American industries.84 Such stringent regulations are 
uncommon in most other markets in the world. 
American companies are placed at the very same competitive dis-
advantage by fellow domestic companies that ignore federal environ-
mental regulations. It makes no difference whether foreign companies 
enjoy competitive advantages because of lax environmental regula-
tions by their home states or whether American companies enjoy 
competitive advantages because of their failure to comply with appli-
cable federal environmental statutes-the same competitive disad-
vantages result. American companies should be just as concerned 
with competitive advantages gained by domestic competitors who 
evade federal environmental regulations-and thereby increase mar-
ket share by avoiding capital costs-as they are with international 
competitors who are not as heavily regulated. 
A. The Benefits of non-Compliance 
Without running afoul of antitrust law, companies seek to increase 
their market share as a means to achieve increased profits. A precur-
sor to increased market share is the development of competitive 
advantages within the marketplace.85 Competitive advantages take 
various forms. Examples of competitive advantages include increased 
production rates, the development of new technologies, and the con-
struction of more efficient facilities.86 There also exist, however, other, 
illegal means of acquiring competitive advantages in the marketplace. 
These illegal means include, among other things, price-fixing, collu-
sion, and tying contracts.87 All of these means are prohibited under 
United States antitrust law.88 
In addition to antitrust violations, corporations in the market place 
may attempt to gain a competitive advantage over competitors by 
delaying compliance with, or ignoring altogether, laws that regulate 
84 See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 
102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2046 (1993) (noting that the United States has the "most expansive liability 
rules for environmental pollution and among the most stringent regulatory requirements in the 
world," resulting in a perceived lack of competitiveness in the international markets by U.S. 
companies). Stewart goes on to say that foreign countries' lack of stringent environmental 
regulations could be seen as a form of unfair competition. Id. at 2049. The same argument could 
be made against those who profit off of their delayed compliance with environmental statutes. 
85 See SHEPARD, supra note 82, at 62. 
86 See id. 
87 See Julian O. Van Kalinowski, Antitrust Laws, 7 TRADE REGULATION (1993) (analyzing 
antitrust statutes). 
88 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1,2,13,14 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). 
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the particular market. For example, ifthere are two companies-com-
pany A and company B-in the same market that are both regulated 
under the Clean Air Act, the decision to comply with all applicable 
regulations may have significant economic implications. If company A 
chooses to comply with a regulation requiring the installation of new 
pollution control equipment, at a cost of one million dollars, the com-
pany may have to raise its product's price to help defray the cost of 
compliance. If company B chooses not to comply with the regulation, 
the company does not incur any compliance costS.89 At the same time, 
as a direct result of the noncompliance, company B does not feel the 
same need as company A did to raise its product's price to defray 
costs. Thus, company B, the non-compliant, is selling its product in 
the marketplace at a lower price.90 Or, alternatively, company B can 
sell its product at the same price as its competitors for an even greater 
profit. Additionally, by ignoring federal violations regulations, com-
pany B can avoid delays caused by mandatory permitting and con-
struction requirements.91 Thus, company B gains a competitive advan-
tage that will probably result in an increased share of the market. 
The EPA's current civil penalty assessment program fails to ac-
count for illegally gained competitive advantages that account for 
increased market share. The EPA hopes to recoup all of the economic 
benefits gained through delayed compliance. Unfortunately, the EPA 
falls short of its goals because companies that avoid initial capital costs 
associated with required pollution control mechanisms do not have to 
pass those costs on. As a result, noncompliants' products may be, and 
probably are, sold at cheaper prices which allow noncompliants to 
increase the share of their markets. 
Although companies are penalized above and beyond the costs of 
timely compliance with the applicable federal environmental regula-
tions, as calculated by the BEN model, the increased profits from the 
increased market share, and/or additional sales, may alone support 
89 See Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Steven C. Salopp, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising 
Rivals Costs To Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 224 (1986). Krattenmaker and 
Salopp state: 
[d. 
Raising rivals' costs can be a particularly effective method of anticompetitive exclusion. 
This strategy need not entail sacrificing one's own profits in the short run; it need not 
require classical market power as a prerequisite for its success; and it may give the 
excluding firm various options in exercising its acquired power. 
90 Sometimes a small difference in price is enough to win a contract bid. Consequently, the 
award of such a contract could result in profits in excess of any future fines levied by an 
environmental enforcement agency. This is true even if there is no corresponding increase in 
net market share. 
91 See Stewart, supra note 84, at 2063. 
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these penalties. Thus, to comply, companies will not have to raise 
prices to offset costs to the same extent as those who originally 
complied because the noncomplying company will possess greater 
financial resources to pay fines and install pollution control equip-
ment-assuming the amount of profits that resulted from the in-
creased market share are large enough to cover the costs of the fines. 
Therefore, delayed compliance may be profitable for companies in 
those instances where ill-gotten profits-associated with illegal mar-
ket share gains-allow companies to pay their fines, comply with 
applicable regulations, and maintain their current prices. Without 
having to pass on the costs of compliance to customers, as other 
companies had to do when they initially installed the required pollu-
tion control mechanisms, companies that acted illegally may preserve 
their ill-gotten increased share of the market. 
B. Market Defined 
In order to account accurately for violators' economic gains, market 
share must be incorporated into the EPA's civil penalty assessment 
program. This incorporation first necessitates a definition of the mar-
ket in which violators operate. Market share is defined as "the per-
centage of a market that is controlled by a firm."92 Although market 
share is an easy concept to understand, market share is difficult to 
measure. There always exist questions raised by marketplace com-
petitors involved in antitrust litigation about the products that com-
panies are producing.93 Another frequently litigated issue concerns 
the precise nature of the market.94 For example, if a company pro-
duces fountain pens, the question arises whether the market includes 
all fountain pens or all writing utensils. Thus, in order to assess 
increased market share one must first determine the relevant market. 
Defining the relevant market is an integral component of antitrust 
litigation.95 The development of antitrust regulation offers guidance 
as to how to best define the relevant market. One cannot accurately 
account for the benefits of environmental noncompliance without first 
defining the parameters in which the noncompliance takes place.96 In 
order to accurately describe a violator's market, an analysis is made 
92 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 876 (5th ed. 1979). 
93 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945) (holding that a 
definition of a defendant's market is necessary to define market power). 
94 See PHILLIP AREEDA AND DONALD F. TuRNER, 2 ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEm ApPLICATION 406 (1978). 
95 See Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d at 424. 
96 See AREEDA AND TuRNER, supra note 94, at 346. 
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to determine the product's geographic distribution, the dimension of 
the product,97 and the dimension of production facilities.98 
After the market is adequately defined, an estimation of the com-
pany's market share is determined.99 Market share is indicative of a 
corporation's competitiveness relative to other companies in the same 
marketYlO The most accurate way to determine a given market share 
is to analyze the corporation's production levels.lol To illustrate, as-
sume there are two, and only two, companies in a given market-com-
pany A and company B. In 1990, both companies produce and sell 
widgets at the same price and both have a fifty percent share of the 
market. In 1991, Congress requires installation of more modern pol-
lution control equipment at the companies' widget facilities and man-
dates immediate compliance. Company A complies with the new regu-
lation at a cost of $750,000 but company B chooses to ignore the 
regulation and continues to produce widgets without pollution control 
equipment. 
As a result of incurring costs for compliance, company A is forced 
to raise its product's price. The rise in cost that is passed along to 
consumers decreases company Ns sales. Company B, whose product 
is still at pre-regulation levels, sees sales increase. Their production 
levels rise and their share of the market increases to sixty percent. 
Company A drops its production levels and its market share drops to 
forty percent. 
When the EPA finally brings an enforcement action against com-
pany B, the penalties will not account for the market share increase.102 
Assuming, arguendo, that the value of the increased market share is 
worth five million dollars to the company, the benefit calculation will 
only account for the delayed compliance time and the gravity compo-
nent. Using the rule-of-thumb method, we can roughly estimate the 
penalty that the BEN model would generate.lOS The calculation would 
be five percent per year from the date of violation until the date of 
expected complianceY)4 If the date of compliance is five years from the 
date of violation the calculation would be twenty five percent (five 
97 See id. (explaining that product dimension is the term used to describe other products that 
could be substituted for the product in question). 
98 [d. 
99 See id. 
100 [d. at 350. 
101 [d. 
IIll See PENALTY POLICY, supra note 3, at 35,083. 
100 See id. 
104 The five percent seems to be a hypothetical discount rate (often used in economic models). 
See id. 
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percent per year) multiplied by $750,000 (capital cost of compliance), 
or $187,500. Even with a gravity component of $100,000, which would 
bring the estimated penalty total to $287,500, the penalty assessment 
does not fully account for company B's true economic gain. If com-
pany B's increased market share, due to noncompliance, is worth 
$5,000,000,105 a penalty assessment of $287,500 will hardly serve as a 
deterrent. Company B will not only be able to pay the fine and absorb 
the cost of compliance, but will still maintain substantial profit mar-
gin over company A. Furthermore, because of the increased market 
share-valued at $5,000,000-company B can pay penalty assessment 
without having to raise its product's price. Thus, company B will 
maintain its position, illegally established, in the market. The penal-
ties will be offset by increased sales, increased profits, and after 
coming into compliance, company B will still find itself with sixty 
percent of the market. Even if costs are eventually levelled, and the 
price of company B's product is roughly equivalent to the price of 
company Ns product, market share will not necessarily decrease. Loss 
of market share will be stemmed by, among other things, goodwill and 
the value oflong-term contractsyJ6 Thus, that delayed compliance, in 
this situation, is not financially injurious to company B. In fact, non-
compliance appears to be profitable. 107 
V. IMPLEMENTING ANALYSIS OF MARKET SHARE INTO THE EPNs 
PENALTY ASSESSMENT PROGRAM 
A. Introduction 
The above analysis demonstrates not only that the EP Ns penalty 
assessment program108 fails to recoup full economic benefits, but that 
105 See id. For increased market share to be a major factor in providing deterrence, and for 
recoupment of full economic gain from illegal activity, the value of the illegal market share will 
have to be larger than the current calculated penalties assessed by using the BEN model. If 
there is no increase in market share, or if the increase in market share results in nominal profits, 
then the current methodology is adequate. 
106 One only has to look at Tylenol products to appreciate the nature of goodwill. Tylenol did 
not see any appreciable long-term loss of its market share due to the sabotage and poisoning of 
its products during the 1980s. 
107 This assumes, of course, that the costs of environmental compliance are not de minimis. If 
such costs were de minimis, then competitors who have complied with environmental regula-
tions would not be disadvantaged; their capital expenditures would not be increased to any 
significant degree because of costs associated with environmental compliance. See Stewart, 
supra note 84, at 2062 (explaining the costs of environmental compliance in the United States). 
108 The criticism is equally applicable to state and local governments, as well as citizen groups 
that help enforce environmental laws by bringing suits for penalties and injunctive relief. 
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it also, in many cases, fails in its chief policy goal to act as a deterrent 
against future violationsYl9 To rectify this situation, the EPA's penalty 
assessment program must penalize companies in relation to the true 
economic benefit gained from noncompliance with environmental regu-
lations. Accounting for increased market share will be a step in the 
right direction. This new assessment methodology will not only serve 
as a greater deterrent but will also protect companies in the market-
place that comply with environmental regulations. Providing equita-
ble enforcement will protect the integrity of the marketplace in the 
regulated community. Additionally, equitable enforcement will achieve 
a truly level playing field for all businesses to compete. It is for these 
reasons that the business community, as well as environmental advo-
cates, should urge the adoption of an increased market share compo-
nent in the EPA's civil penalty assessment program. 
Some argue that such a method cannot be implemented. l1O Criti-
cisms, however, belie the fact that market share analysis is already 
frequently used in antitrust litigation.111 Although it is beyond the 
scope of this Article to offer implementing legislation, skilled legisla-
tive drafters have a developed body of antitrust case law to use for 
guidance in formulating a particular market share analysis for envi-
ronmental regulations.l12 
B. The Creation of a Presumption That Increased Market Share is 
the Direct Result of non-Compliance 
The EPA and other environmental enforcement agencies should 
presume, for the purpose of calculating the economic benefit compo-
nent, that increased market share, since the inception of violations, 
resulted directly from non-compliance. Although the defendants could 
seek to minimize the economic benefit component figure by supplying 
financial data supportive of another conclusion, the figure's accuracy 
could be determined, in part, by requesting the same information from 
109 See Schneider, supra note 4, at D22. 
110 See, e.g., Fuhrman, supra note 69, at 10,248 n.18 (claiming that the "[clalculation of the 
competitive advantage is fraught with difficulties"). This is the same article that stated un-
equivocally that "deficiencies of the BEN model heavily bias the calculations against the defen-
dants." Id. at 10,246; see also Saunders, supra note 75, at 10,008 (stating that protracted 
litigation and quantitative complexities discourage implementation). 
111 See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 40 (1977) (stating 
that since United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), defining a 
geographic and product market has been consistently used in antitrust litigation). 
112 See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States v. E.I. DuPont 
DeNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956). 
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other competitors in the market. Information could also be gleaned 
from trade associations in the industry. Information could be de-
manded pursuant to various information gathering provisions located 
in environmental statutes.ll3 Courts will generally defer to an agency's 
findings if the agency's position is supported by a well reasoned, 
clearly articulated, and thoroughly documented analysisY4 Keeping 
this deference in mind, the EPA could add market share increase to 
the thirteen factors that the BEN model currently uses. Alleged 
violators would be allowed, as they are with other BEN factors, to 
supply information to aid in the EPA's findings,115 Again, any increased 
market share, measured from the beginning of the period of non-com-
pliance, would be presumed to result from non-compliance. In order 
to quantify the percentage of increase and arrive at a dollar penalty 
amount, the same percentage of increased profits, adjusted for infla-
tion, would be used. 
This Article proposes a three step formula to account for the eco-
nomic benefit derived from increased market share due to environ-
mental noncompliance. First, to determine the value of the increased 
market share, divide the illegal annual profits by the annual rate of 
return in a given year, or IMS = IP / ROR. To continue with the 
Company B example,116 $5,000,000 (value of increased market share) 
= 500,000/10% ROR. To adequately utilize this formula, however, the 
amount of illegal profits must be determined. The illegal profit figure 
(IP) is the average ll7 profit made for five years prior to the beginning 
of the illegal conduct and the average profits for the years immedi-
ately preceding the return to compliance. The lower earlier profits are 
then subtracted from higher profits. The EPA, using provisions such 
as section 114 of the Clean Air Act,118 would gather information from 
trade associations and other competitors in the market place in an 
attempt to verify the valuation of the illegal increase in market share. 
The illegal profits are then divided by the rate of return representative 
of the years during which the violations continued. 
113 See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 114, 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (setting out the 
Administrator's authority to require the submission of relevant information). 
114 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) 
(requiring courts to defer to agency interpretations). 
115 See 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a)(1)(E) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d)(3) (1988). 
116 See text, supra, at 24-25. 
117 Averaging, or some other measure of centrality, such as mean or median, can be used. 
118 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7414 (providing for recordkeeping, inspections, monitoring, 
and entry). 
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The second equation determines the value of the illegal benefit over 
the course of the violation, in the same way that the BEN model 
calculates the time value of money not spent on required control 
equipment.119 The calculation is the simple addition of any profits 
during the period of violations in excess of typical profits before the 
violations. In the Company B example, the illegal excessive profits 
averaged $500,000 a year for each of the five years of violation, cre-
ating a sum total of $2,500,000. This illegal profit plus the illegal 
market share value of $5 million, equals a $7.5 million economic benefit 
gained from increased market share and increased sales. 
C. Corporate Suits to Supplement Citizens' Suits 
Many environmental statutes contain provisions for citizens' suits pO 
Most citizens' suits are filed from information gleaned under the Free-
dom of Information Act (FOIA).121 FOIA allows environmental groups 
to examine information submitted to the EPA in mandated filings.122 
To date, corporations have not actively engaged in litigation under 
FOIA's disclosure provisions.123 Incorporating increased market share 
into the EPA's penalty assessment program, however, may change 
companies' lack of activity over these provisions. Corporate America 
could find itself prosecuting more violators of environmental regula-
tions. If a company suspects that another company is not complying 
with environmental regulations, the complying company would have 
a strong motivation to bring an action against the violator if the 
complying company believed that the penalty assessed would pro-
mote parity in the marketplace.l24 Companies that bring suit would 
have to obtain information under FOIA, much like citizens' groups do 
now, to determine if competitors are in violation of any of the appli-
cable federal environmental regulations. 
As a public policy matter, this policy proposition has far reaching 
implications. The proposition serves three purposes: it increases the 
deterrent factor of the EPA's civil penalty assessments; it ensures a 
level playing field for those corporations who comply with environ-
119 See FRAMEWORK, supra note 13, at 35,076. 
100 See generally Barry Boyer and Errol Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A 
Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental Law, 34 BUFF. L. 
REV. 833, 844 (1985) (giving an overview of citizen suit provisions and their use). 
121 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988). 
122 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1988); see also 33 U.S.C. § 1318 (1988) (reports filed with EPA by 
regulated companies must be generally available to public under Clean Water Act). 
1Zl See generally Boyer and Meidinger, supra note 120, at 864--66. 
124 These suits, of course, would be subject to Rule 11 to prevent frivolous filings. 
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mental regulations; and it potentially eases the EPA's enforcement 
burden. These three factors should have widespread appeal. 
The EPA should approve of the modified penalty assessment pro-
gram because the regulated community would take a greater role in 
policing the competitors in its own markets. Corporate America should 
also support the modified penalty assessment program because the 
program would prevent illegal gains in the marketplace while protect-
ing those companies that have incurred costs associated with regula-
tory compliance. These benefits would occur without any significant 
increase in government regulation. Not only is the marketplace left 
in much the same way that it exists now, but its very foundation is 
also strengthened; equity in the regulated community may finally be 
achieved. Lastly, citizens' groups will embrace the modified penalty 
assessment program because the inclusion of increased market share 
in penalty assessments will lead to greater penalties and more effec-
tive deterrence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In order to effectuate its policy goals of deterrence, the EPA must 
address the inadequacies of its civil penalty assessment program. 
Although the EPA's goals are admirable, they are frequently not 
realized. Too often companies, by delaying compliance, profit at the 
expense of the environment and other companies similarly situated in 
the same market that have complied with environmental regulations. 
In order to protect the marketplace and the environment, the EPA 
must take steps to determine accurately the true benefits of non-com-
pliance with federal environmental regulations. These steps should 
include an assessment of increased market share and would address 
the problems inherent in the current methodology. Although such 
an assessment would place additional administrative burdens on the 
EPA, these burdens would be minimized by the fact that corporations 
would be gathering and supplying much of the information needed to 
assess market share. This process is no different from the processes 
used in determining other factors utilized in the BEN model. Addi-
tionally, administrative burdens would be offset, or even reduced, by 
the presumption discussed in Section V(B) and by increased enforce-
ment by the regulated community. In the alternative, the burdens 
would be reduced by the additional monies collected vis-a-vis in-
creased fines in those jurisdictions where penalties fund the enforce-
ment agency. Even if there exist additional administrative burdens, 
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they should never be allowed to prevent the protection of either the 
environment or the marketplace. 
It is imperative, for the sake of environment and the regulated 
community, that the EPA reassess its civil penalty assessment pro-
gram. The need to incorporate a civil penalty assessment program 
that accounts for increased market share is evidenced by companies' 
continued disregard for environmental regulations. The BEN model 
is currently not strong enough to deter the violation of environmental 
regulations. The policy recommendations in this Article offer alterna-
tives that come at the expense of neither legitimate businesses nor 
the environment, but rather at the expense of companies who seek to 
gain an economic advantage over their competitors through non-com-
liance. 
